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Arid shrub-lands in Syria and elsewhere in West Asia and North Africa are 
widely thought degraded. Characteristic of these areas is a preponderance of unpalatable 
shrubs or a lack of overall ground cover with a rise in the associated risks of soil erosion.  
Migrating pastoralists have been the scapegoats for this condition of the range.  State 
steppe interventions of the last forty years have reflected this with programs to supplant 
customary systems with structures and institutions promoting western grazing systems 
and technologies.  Principal amongst the latter has been shrub technology, particularly 
Atriplex species, for use in land rehabilitation and as a fodder reserve.  This paper 
deconstructs state steppe policy in Syria by examining the overlap and interface of 
government and customary legal systems as a factor in the history of shrub technology 
transfer in the Syrian steppe.  It is argued that the link made between signs of degradation 
and perceived moribund customary systems is not at all causal. Indeed, customary 
systems are found to be adaptive and resilient, and a strong influence on steppe 
management and the fate of technology transfer initiatives.  Furthermore, developments 
in rangeland ecology raise questions about claims for grazing-induced degradation and 
call for a reinterpretation of recent shifts in vegetation on the Syrian steppe.  Given the 
ineffectiveness of past state interventions, and in view of renewed understanding of 
customary systems and rangeland ecology, decentralization and some devolution of 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Arid rangelands dominate the countries of West Asia and North Africa (WANA).  
Syria, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is better endowed with arable lands than 
most countries in the region but still just over half its area, or 10.2 million hectares, falls 
below the 200mm isohyet and is designated as badiah or 'steppe' where cultivation is 
outlawed.  In the steppe the majority of people are tribally organized and dependent on a 
migratory pastoral or agro-pastoral economy where mobility and natural resource 
management are facilitated by extensive customary systems. However, for much of this 
century, migratory pastoralists have been blamed for being the key instigators of land 
degradation.  Most WANA states won their independence after World War II and pursued 
policies of nation building and economic growth, neither of which carved out a role for tribes 
or migratory pastoralism.  Not only did the state generally perceive that the tribe and their 
mobility were divisive and unstable elements in a fledgling nation, they saw customary 
grazing practices as archaic, inefficient and environmentally exploitative. The tribe was seen 
as a political and environmental threat that if not eliminated would undermine the new 
state and stifle economic growth.  
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2  International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas. 
3  CRC for Weed Management Systems, Charles Sturt University. 
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With the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the 
United Nations and other aid agencies, many WANA states sidestepped and sought to 
suffocate customary practices, and "green the desert" with the introduction of national 
rangeland management.  Coming in the early years of independence for many of the 
WANA countries, the dominance of this paradigm had considerable influence on the 
direction and evolution of state institutions responsible for steppe management.  This 
paper looks specifically at Syria and examines the impact of national policy over the past 
forty years on the institutions governing range management, as well as how the overlap 
and interface of the Syrian government and customary legal systems have shaped the 
history of shrub technology transfer in the Syrian steppe.  
 
2.  RANGELAND DEGRADATION: MODELS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
THEORETICAL MODELS APPLYING TO RANGELANDS 
 
The characterization of moving tribes as creators of desert conditions has a long 
history among people of the settled areas in the region and further afield (Ibn Khaldun 
translated in Issawi 1987; Bietenholz 1963).  Hardin (1968) described a rationale for this 
position in his influential "Tragedy of the Commons" paper.  He considered the 
perspective of a rational herder with private ownership of livestock in a pastoral society 
that is reliant on pastures "open to all".  Herders would follow the incentive to increase 
the number of their herd because they would receive direct benefit but bear only a share 
of the costs resulting from the delayed impact of their action.  Each herder is "locked into 
a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited 




rangeland management is not possible without strong state involvement.  This theory has 
formed the rationale for state governance over rangelands and other natural resources in 
many developing countries. 
State programs to assess, manage or increase productivity of steppe areas are also 
based on a model of how the steppe ecosystem functions. Predominant in rangeland 
management science for much of this century has been the range succession model, 
which derives from plant ecology (Westoby et al.1989).  It assumes that the livestock 
sector operates in environments that are largely stable, where weather variability is 
limited to a narrow range and therefore inconsequential for long-term outcomes.  The 
model supposes that a given rangeland continually returns to a single persistent state (the 
climax) of vegetation in the absence of grazing.  By producing changes in the opposite 
direction, grazing pressure arising from a set stocking rate can slow or halt the 
successional tendency, producing an equilibrium in vegetation levels.  This theory has 
guided the principles of the western ranching system, which were subsequently 
introduced in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and WANA to supplant customary 
practices.  These included private rights to graze, rotational or paddock grazing systems, 
the establishment of water points to spread grazing pressure, the setting of a universal 




Whereas there are widespread claims for degradation in Syria, only limited 
inventories and no long-term studies of the steppe flora have been carried out.  Despite 
this, numerous references in the literature attest to the 'degraded' nature of the vegetation.  




range management specialists and ecologists have stressed that the range grazing of the 
steppe and semi desert regions of Syria—is progressively deteriorating as a result of 
overgrazing" (FAO 1956).  A 1985 study of the Syrian rangelands by the Arab Center for 
the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry lands (ACSAD 1992) suggested that unpalatable shrub 
species have become "dominant in large areas of the steppe".  It went on to estimate that 
25% of the steppe is affected by wind erosion to one degree or another, while water 
erosion affects around 6% of the area.  Furthermore, almost all relevant publications 
issued from the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas 
(ICARDA), which is based in Aleppo, are premised on the assumption of widespread 
degradation in the Syrian steppe (Rae 1999).  Yet, evidence exists to the contrary. 
An unpalatable shrub associated with a degraded steppe in Syria and neighboring 
regions is the spiny Noaea mucronata.  An ecological study carried out by Deiri (1990) 
under the auspices of ICARDA, found Noaea ubiquitous in the Aleppo steppe, masking 
the heterogeneity of climate and soil.  Apparently, dominance of Noaea in some areas is a 
relatively new phenomenon here (Sankary 1982) and elsewhere (Zakirov 1989; Noy-Mier 
1990).  Deiri and others have assumed that this shift in floral composition is the result of 
overgrazing for lack of good management, and that with a reduction in grazing pressure a 
climax community dominated by the palatable shrub Salsola vermiculata would return 
(Deiri 1990; Sankary 1982).  However, the link between cause and effect is not 
adequately demonstrated.   
Indeed, the basis of an alternative interpretation comes from grazing trials carried 
out by the FAO and the Steppe Directorate in the 1960s at Wadi al-`Azib research station 




different stocking rate in each (trial A: 9ha per sheep, B: 6ha, and C: 4.5ha).  No sizeable 
differences in average meat production per animal were reported between the three 
treatments.  As for the vegetation, it was noted that plant density "fluctuated more 
between years than between stocking rate treatments" (FAO 1966), suggesting climate 
more than grazing determines productivity.  The reported vegetation change was, 
however, unexpected.  Spininess in plants is usually interpreted as an anti-grazing 
adaptation, and it has often been recorded that spiny plants increase under heavy grazing 
but give way once protected (Noy-Mier 1990).  In treatment C, with the highest stocking 
rate there was a "reduction" in the spiny variety Noaea while in treatment A, with the 
lowest stocking rate, Noaea "increased greatly in density" (FAO 1966, 1967).  The cause 
of this vegetation change is not alluded to by either of the reports at hand; Noaea is just 
described as "a spiny, undesirable shrub".  
An explanation for the expansion of Noaea under reduced grazing pressure is 
given by another study in the Negev and Jerusalem deserts (Noy-Mier 1990).  During 
certain periods on the open range, Noaea are exposed to heavy pressure from herbivores 
selecting for the rare green material.  Even though spines and other types of protection 
save the plants from local extinction, Noy-Mier asserted they are insufficient to outweigh 
grazing pressure and are therefore among the first plants to benefit when an area is 
protected.  
The crucial difference between Noaea mucronata and other shrubs is its extended 
growing period.  Heavy grazing either end of the green season disadvantages Noaea, but 
when such grazing pressure is relieved the extended growing period becomes an 




and summer is largely removed.  Also, whereas as recently as thirty years ago almost all 
herders wintering (November-February) on the near steppe sustained their flocks entirely 
from grazing
6, today almost none do. Instead they feed their sheep on hand-feed 
generally imported from the settled areas
7.  Thus, rather than being due to overgrazing, 
the shift to Noaea mucronata is a result of changes in the composition of livestock 
grazing the steppe coupled with the adoption and widespread use of hand feed for 
winter—something encouraged by the state following the 1958-61 drought (Lewis 1987).   
Conclusions like this bring into question the validity of the range succession 
model in arid environments.  Whereas the model predicts that rainfall cycles combined 
with sustained grazing pressure will keep range vegetation in equilibrium, it is now 
thought that where droughts or other episodic events are a feature, population fluctuations 
hinder plants and herbivores from establishing closely linked interactions, and succession 
is abbreviated or non-existent (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994).  This realization that 
equilibrium conditions are not met in many instances has led to the development of an 
alternative paradigm centered around two models: the non-equilibrium model, which 
deals with population dynamics in uncertain environments; and the state-and-transition 
model (Westoby, Walker and Noy-Mier 1989).  In contrast to the linear succession 
model, it is argued that rangeland dynamics can be more accurately described by a set of 
discrete states of vegetation with discrete transitions between them, triggered by natural 
events, like floods, drought or fire, either alone or in combination with herbivore activity.   
                                                 
6 Van de Veen estimates that 58% of the Syrian sheep population, or 3.8 million head, resided in the steppe 
for winter grazing only shrubs, amongst them Noaea mucronata and Haloxylon articulatum (FAO 1967). 
7 In an in-depth two-year study on animal diets of 129 herds frequenting the Aleppo steppe 98% of feed 
needs came from hand-feeding, the remainder from crop residues. No steppe grazing was reported during 





Objectively apportioning responsibility for perceived or actual changes in steppe 
vegetation composition is therefore difficult.  Grazing inevitably has an impact on shrub 
communities, but the nature of this impact is unclear, particularly when causes arise from 
a conjunction of other factors in addition to grazing.  Indeed, some speculate that the 
landscape may in some sense be 'adapted' to grazing pressure.  That is, either less 
resistant shrub species have been eliminated long ago or the species in these communities 
have adapted to grazing pressure. There is even some evidence to suggest that a certain 
amount of grazing pressure on arid rangelands maintains or even enhances floral species 
diversity (Olsvig-Whittaker et al. 1993; Perevolotsky 1995).  In the case of the transition 
to Noaea mucronata, it seems likely that this was actually brought about by a reduction in 
grazing during critical times of the year.  
Despite the lack of a clear consensus on the best model for predicting the extent 
and causes of rangeland degradation, the Syrian government, aided by international 
research and development institutions, has undertaken several measures to bring about a 
change in rangeland management for the stated purpose of improving environmental 
outcomes.  Actions have reflected a persistent adherence to 'tragedy of the commons' and 
rangeland succession models.  They span from centralizing the governance and 
enforcement of rangeland management to introducing new technologies designed to 
enhance the quantity and quality of rangeland vegetation.  The following section will 
discuss shrub and plantation technologies that have been developed, extended, and often 
imposed on herders occupying the Syrian steppe.  Despite more than 50 years of 
technological efforts, however, technology uptake has lagged far behind expectations.  




technical solutions that demonstrate the important role played by customary institutions 
in steppe management and shed light on the underlying reasons for the lack of adoption 
success. 
 
3.  PERFORMANCE OF TECHNOLOGIES AIMED AT IMPROVING 
RANGELAND CONDITIONS 
ATRIPLEX SHRUB TECHNOLOGY 
 
From its creation in 1961, the Steppe Directorate (SD) of the Syrian government 
was given responsibility for range management, range and pasture research, management 
and expansion of government wells, and organization of emergency feed during times of 
drought.  With the assistance of the FAO, the SD embarked on a highly centralized range 
management initiative, setting the tenor for all future interventions.  Part of this initiative 
included trials to identify rain-use efficient, edible plants to re-vegetate the steppe and act 
as a drought feed store.  This was deemed necessary, for though the successional model 
predicted natural regeneration towards a climax community, climatic variability and the 
unpredictable recurrence of devastating droughts meant that natural regeneration could be 
a long time coming.  Shrub planting would fill this temporal gap, check soil erosion and 
provide a source of animal feed during drought.  The trials concluded in the late 1960s 
recommending Atriplex, a shrub species already favored by range managers elsewhere 
around the world, most notably Australia, South Africa and the United States (Houerou 
1995). 
Le Houerou, one of the most influential people involved in rangeland 
management and rehabilitation in the WANA region over the last thirty years, describes 




if not the only one" (Le Houerou 1992).  The shrubs can prevent wind and water erosion 
and are efficient users of water (McKell 1975).  They could also serve as a feed reserve in 
years of drought.  There are around 400 species of Atriplex in the world, most in mid-
latitude temperate, sub-tropical and Mediterranean zones.  Though many Atriplex species 
exist in the Mediterranean region, their use in arid land stabilization and rehabilitation 
began with the introduction of the Australian variety Atriplex nummularia into Tunisia in 
the last years of the 19th century (McKell 1975).  The introduction of this and other 
varieties from Australia continued after World War I in Tunisia and Morocco.  By the 
1950s, Atriplex was being recommended for steppe rehabilitation in FAO circles, and 
from the 1960s introductions took place throughout the WANA region and further afield.  
Although many trials of non-indigenous species showed limited promise, Omar Draz, 
FAO's chief advisor to the Syrian government on rangeland issues, conducted trials in 
1968-69 with Atriplex nummularia that produced successful outcomes in an agricultural 
district of Aleppo (FAO 1974).   
With the support of Draz and a wider scientific consensus for the technology, the 
Syrian authorities initiated programs to transfer Atriplex on the steppe. History of this 
intervention in Syria can conveniently be divided into two phases: 1) encouraging and 
later obliging agro-pastoralists to plant a part of their area with Atriplex; and then 2) the 
establishment of government-run fodder shrub plantations from 1987.  The first phase 
envisaged that agro-pastoralists would forego barley cultivation over a portion of their 
licensed steppe area and plant Atriplex in its place. In hindsight poor adoption rates for 
Atriplex were a foregone conclusion. Barley is nutritious and palatable, while post-




contrast, it can take between three and five months for sheep grazing Atriplex to get used 
to consuming and digesting it. Oxalates in the plant are potentially toxic to some 
ruminant microorganisms and can form stones in the urinary tract (Goodchild & Osman 
1993).  Furthermore, to compensate for the high salt content of the plant, the animal must 
drink between 6 and 12 liters of water day (depending on the heat of the day), twice the 
normal levels (Le Houerou 1992; Nordblom et al. 1995).  Nor does Atriplex fit 
comfortably in the bedouin farming system.  The "proper" time to harvest most Atriplex 
used in Syria is late summer and early autumn, a period when most sheep are grazing 
nutritious cotton residues in the settled areas (Wachholtz 1996).  Not surprisingly, only a 
fraction of those cultivating in the steppe actually planted Atriplex, and of those all but a 
handful ensured their private plantation survived, the others—with the shrubs gone—
again cultivated barley (Leybourne et al. 1993).  
 
THE PLANTATION APPROACH 
 
The poor success of government initiatives to encourage or require private 
adoption of range technology led directly to the 'plantation concept'. Here, the 
government effectively privatizes an area of steppe with a trench, plants the enclosure 
with shrubs, and after a period of establishment permits range users restricted access 
under contract and on payment of a grazing fee.  The idea is not unique to Syria.  In the 
last two decades, 470,000 ha have been taken for plantations in Tunisia, 133,000 ha in 
Iran, 33,000 ha in Algeria, and there are many others (World Bank 1995).  In Syria, the 
plantations have been at the heart of state intervention in the steppe since the late 1980s 




The plantation concept came after a generation of frustrated state intervention in 
rangeland management and technology transfer.  It represented a significant step against 
the tide of devolution in natural resource management elsewhere, and instead advocated 
centralization as a solution for sustainable development in arid regions.  The actual 
presence on the steppe of the plantations, coupled with the fact the state had tilled and 
planted the land (i.e. invested), brought the formal legal system and state authorities into 
direct conflict with the customary land tenure system like never before.  
Plantations are supposedly located where Steppe Directorate (SD) officials judge 
the steppe to be degraded.  Only private steppe land (approximately 2%) cannot be 
included within a plantation; otherwise all other land (including cultivated fields and co-
operative pastures) is technically state land, and can therefore be appropriated, despite the 
fact that customary institutions have governed land tenure for centuries.  Once the site 
and size are determined, a committee is appointed within the Ministry of Agricultural and 
Agrarian Reform (MAAR), to produce a technical and economic feasibility study for the 
proposed plantation
8.  Socio-economic or environmental impact assessments are not 
regularly carried out. If the committee gives the go ahead, MAAR provides financial 
support for plantation establishment. 
After a period of shrub establishment, averaging five years, the plantations are 
opened under contract for use during restricted periods, generally a couple months each 
in the winter and spring.  Enforcement of plantation rules is the prime responsibility of 
the Steppe Directorate but the rules themselves are decided on at the provincial level by 
                                                 
8 The committee is composed of an agricultural economist, a geologist, and representatives from the 





9 and hence vary.  However, the following rules are broadly 
applicable.  The carrying capacity of all the plantations was set at three head-of-sheep per 
hectare in 1995, and has not changed since. In line with the succession model of plant 
ecology, if the SD officials feel that grazing is insufficient in a particular season, access 
to the plantations is delayed, truncated, or denied completely.  Firewood collection 
camping, milking and watering are prohibited in the plantations during leasing.  A 
deposit on the contract is also required in some provinces, including Aleppo, and where 
this is the case each contract is clearly designated an allotted area.  The cost to a herder 
for a spring contract is harmonized across the country, at 125 Syrian Lira (SL) ($2.25) 
per hectare per month. 
On the frontline of plantation rule enforcement are year-round resident guards.    
Those caught trespassing in Aleppo province are fined 5,000 SL, the equivalent of around 
$100 or the price of a two-year old ewe.  The official number of trespassers prosecuted in 
the country since the plantations were first opened in 1995 is estimated around a 
thousand, the vast majority of them reportedly at two plantations in the Aleppo steppe
10.  
 
                                                 
9 The Agricultural Council is chaired by the provincial governor and includes provincial heads for 
Agriculture, Finance, the Ba`th Party, and the Peasants' Union. 




TECHNOLOGICAL OUTCOMES, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
Syrian authorities have sought to transfer shrub technology to the steppe through a 
variety of institutional arrangements, all of which have discounted customary land tenure 
and property rights.  The underlying premise for the state approach is rooted in the 
'tragedy of the commons' model of pastoral society, which hinges on the assumption of 
non co-operating herders and eventual degradation.  
While many researchers and rangeland scientists implicate government policy 
itself for the decline of customary systems, a pervasive perception is that the system is 
unable to adapt to changing socio-economic conditions (FAO 1967; World Bank 1995; 
Ngaido 1997).   
Customary systems in Syria, as elsewhere, have been perceived as being unable to 
regulate pasture use in the face of pressures from increasing human and animal 
populations, and a diminishing range area. Some have felt that the organizational and 
institutional basis on which the customary system relies is in a process of irreversible 
decline as an inevitable consequence of modernization (UN 1955; Abu Jaber 1966). That 
is, tribes weaken as they become superfluous in the presence of a maturing and 
ubiquitous judiciary and civil administration system.  
Research on customary control and access systems in Syria is noticeable for its 
absence.  The tribes have been identified as the cause of degradation by a process of 
deductive reasoning from ecology and political science theories, and re-enforced by 
ambivalent attitudes held by policymakers towards migratory groups.  Herders' resistance to 
adoption of technologies and institutions imposed by government authorities is not well 




understanding of the institutions governing rangeland management and the incentives 
underlying adoption behavior necessitates a detailed appreciation of the customary system, 
state centralization, capitalist penetration and the evolution of these institutions in Syria 
during the 20th century.  
4.  PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SYRIA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Modern-day Syria is a relatively new phenomenon. It was originally carved out of 
two Ottoman Provinces after World War I and placed under French Mandatory rule 
before the country won its independence in 1944.  A judicial-political division, called the 
'steppe line', was inherited by the French and subsequently by the nationalists.  It was first 
defined in state law in 1870 by a centralizing Ottoman government wanting to 
encapsulate and subject the moving camel and sheep rearing tribes of the desert interior.  
Within the steppe line, the state recognized the authority of customary law and courts in 
regulating the activities of tribal society, including land tenure issues. What amounted to 
a "state within a state" remained ostensibly unchanged following independence, but it 
was an obvious anathema to a fledgling nation, and within fourteen years customary law 
and tribes were formally abolished, and the steppe areas nationalized.  This was of 
historic importance for it was the last legislation to deal specifically with the tribes and 
marked the final act in the long struggle by central governments to eliminate the tribes 
and shaykhs as rivals to their own power and jurisdiction.  
Key to understanding property rights in Syria is the concept of legal pluralism. 
For a long time the formal legal system of the state, the qanun, co-existed with tribal 
customary law, `urf.  Whereas the qanun is by definition written, the `urf is largely 




as one of the sources of Islamic law, shari`a, itself a pillar of the qanun (Heyd 1973).  
The moving tribes were rarely subject to qanun prior to 1958.  Amongst them customary 
law prevailed in all matters including marriage, divorce, homicide and property rights.  
These tribal legal institutions have been described as "remarkable for their sophistication, 
and a central feature of the culture" (Stewart 1995). 
The question of property rights in the steppe area was not of much concern to the 
authorities prior to the 1940s.  Historically, the government's principal interest in rural 
property rights has been in regulating and taxing cultivation.  The authority of the state 
has broadly correlated with the extent of cultivation, and both have waxed and waned at 
various times in history. Cultivation's most recent expansion began in the 1840s with 
impetus from world trade and later a growing domestic human population.  For a century 
this expansion was mostly accommodated within the steppe line, particularly south of 
Aleppo City and the Euphrates River.  Rising international and local demands were also 
encouraging expansion of sheep numbers in the steppe. These two forces of expanding 
cultivation and growing sheep numbers converged along the margins of the steppe in the 
early 1940s, raising land scarcity and precipitating dramatic developments in both the 
statutory and customary land tenure systems. 
 
THE STATUTORY TENURE SYSTEM 
 
In Islamic law and prevalent in Syria until the 1950s, the uncultivated steppe was 
categorized mawat, or dead land.  On mawat land no taxes were claimed by the state and 
all persons could "cut for fuel and for building—or collect herbage—without anyone 
being able to prevent him" (Ottoman Land Code 1858).  As for cultivation, Sunni jurists 




encouraged (Maktari 1971), although the state retained the right to demand consent prior 
to cultivation in lieu of a fee.  This said, such consent was largely academic in the steppe 
prior to state expansion in the late 19th century and was never fully enforced thereafter.  
Prescriptive rights and the ancient category of mawat were eventually abolished in the 
first years of independence (1952), and all such land was re-classed as state land (amlak 
dawlah).  Mawat was seen as a legitimization of open access and the destructive habits 
that this in principal engenders amongst resource users.  
Nationalization not only underscored the authority of the state to regulate land use 
but also provided the state a tool with which to further reduce tribal power.  The law, 
however, failed to make a material impact until 1958 when the sway of customary law 
among the tribes was officially abolished and a government more bent on state-led steppe 
development, the Socialist Ba`th Party, came to power in 1963.  They originally espoused 
"pragmatism and evolutionism within the national framework" (Abu Jaber 1966) and 
advocated the dispersal and sedentarization of moving tribes in order that individual 
loyalty could be redirected toward national goals. The Ba'thist constitution states:   
 
Nomadism is a primitive social state. It decreases the national output and 
makes an important part of the nation a paralyzed member and an obstacle 
to its development and progress. The party struggles for the 
sedentarization of nomads by the grants of land to them [and] for the 
abolition of tribal custom (Art.43) 
 
The abolition of tribal rights coincided with the start of a severe drought (1958-
1961) that destroyed herds on an unprecedented scale. According to official estimates, 
80% of the camel population was killed while the sheep population dropped from 6 
million in 1957 to 3.5 million in 1961 (FAO 1967).  The single most important 




within the MAAR to take on range management and alleviate the impact of future 
droughts. With virgin cultivable land in the country now thought to be exhausted, 
considerable state resources were redirected to steppe management and animal husbandry 
in the hopes of stabilizing and expanding meat production.  FAO had charged that over-
grazing, absence of grazing control mechanisms, expansion of cultivation, and the 
uprooting of shrubs had together "resulted in the grazing capacity of the steppe being 
seriously depleted" (FAO 1973). These factors, along with the current breeding system 
and the region's susceptibility to drought, were implicated in adversely affecting the 
nation's terms of trade and balance of payments, since livestock meat and grains tended to 
be exported at low prices and imported at high prices.  
With the guiding principles of import substitution and food security through self-
sufficiency, the authorities devised a four-point plan for steppe development with 
assistance from the FAO, the impact of which continues to be felt today.  It proposed to 
regenerate the steppe through controlled grazing, increase local production of forage, 
create feed supplies to meet emergencies caused by drought, and improve sheep 
fattening.  Their target was 11 million sheep by 1985, which would contribute to a 
desired increase in per capita meat consumption and at the same time continue the 
valuable export trade for which there was a large demand in neighboring countries (FAO 
1967).  To fulfill these ambitious objectives, the Steppe Directorate initiated research in 
shrub technology for range rehabilitation and initiated in 1968 a rotational grazing 
scheme within a co-operative model termed Hema to supplant the tribal system.  Showing 
little resemblance to a perceived indigenous mechanism of controlled grazing that 




structures for political ends, and the government's inability to supply credible grazing 
management institutions and structures undermined the cooperative approach. 
 
THE CUSTOMARY TENURE SYSTEM 
 
The prevailing assumption of the inadequacy of the tribal system to manage 
steppe resources supposedly stems from the failure of the tribes to either evolve their 
institutions to adapt to changing socio-economic conditions or to resist suppression by a 
nationalist state.  Evidence uncovered from examining the case of tribes and land tenure 
in the northern region of the Syrian steppe reveals an alternative history for the customary 
system. Indeed, there is clear indication of an evolving, resilient customary system here, 
one that has not only endured repression by the state but has obliged government 
authorities to resume a positive and active role in its institutions.  
All Arab tribal individuals belong to a particular tribe, which imparts an 
authenticity of descent and a quality of honor that sets them apart from non-tribal society 
(Dresch 1993; Hourani 1991).  Individual families form larger groups, called `quam 
(sing. qom), the fundamental organizing units within a tribe.  A collection of `quam forms 
a maximal lineage or clan, called fakhdh.  Families within a clan rely on group collective 
action and commonly hold water and pastures together (Wilkinson 1983). Generally, a 
council of elders guides the clan, and in many instances there is a well-respected 
individual amongst them, a mukhtar or wajih, who can speak for the group as a whole.  A 
tribe is much larger, often comprising several villages or herding groups.  Common to 
many tribes and clans is the ethno-political ideology of patrilineal descent or shared 




understood as a metaphor for signifying notions of closeness (LaBianca 1990). In the 
wider region, most tribes also have had long histories of a specific territorial identity
11.  
Tribal society has a wealth of social capital: the social relations and norms 
embedded in the structures of their society that regulate interactions. Things do change 
over time, but given that individuals involved in any of these social structures will engage 
in repeated interactions, each relationship is guided by expectations of predictable 
behavior, leading to trust and reciprocity.  Such trust underpins the customary land tenure 
system and its flexibility.  The fact that the state has had to take overt actions to break up 
customary systems and as yet remains unable to do away with them attests to the strength 
and utility of these social capital networks.  
A group associated with a territory holds the exclusive right to invest in land, such 
as digging a well, building a house, or cultivating a field.  They also hold the right to 
graze and exclude others, but given the nature of an arid environment and the size of any 
one territory, herders inevitably need to maintain flexible, reciprocal arrangements with 
other groups to maintain mobility.  Hence, social capital is a critical ingredient upholding 
such arrangements and assuring mutual compliance.  Events that transpired at the turn of 
the 20th century in the Aleppo steppe illustrate the important role played by such 
adaptive customary institutions in the face of resource competition. 
Before the arrival of trucks, the broad region in which a tribe migrated throughout 
the year was (and sometimes still is) known as the dirah.  It represented a functional area 
of habitual use composed of water holes and associated pastures to which the group held 
rights. In drought years when parts or all of a dirah were affected, families, groups or 
                                                 




larger parts of a tribe sought water and pastures through social networks in the dirah of 
other tribes. 
At the turn of the 20th century the Aleppo steppe was dominated by two 
neighboring sheep herding tribes, the Hadidiyin and the Mawali, and a powerful camel-
herding tribe called the Sba`ah.  The size of the dirah depended on the herding animal, 
with camels-herders having substantially larger dirah and venturing deeper into the desert 
then their brethren, the sheep and goat herders.  These latter herders were restricted by 
the water dependency of their animals to the desert fringes where water sources were 
more frequent and plentiful.  The Sba`ah spent their winter and early spring around wells 
of Wadi Hauran and its environs in modern-day western Iraq, 500 km southeast of the 
Aleppo steppe line. In spring the Sba`ah migrated to the Aleppo steppe were they stayed 
the summer occupying water points and pastures just vacated by the sheep herding tribes, 
the Hadidiyin and the Mawali.  There, they traded with the settled areas, and grazed their 
animals on steppe shrubs largely unpalatable to sheep.  This complementary and non-
exclusive use of water and pastures between the sheep and camel rearing tribes has an 
ancient history in the region, with rights to waters and pastures in the near steppe and the 
time windows on seasonal movement acknowledged in a written tribal treaty signed in 
the last years of the Ottoman Empire (1907-1918) (Zakrya 1947). 
This agreement lasted until the 1940s. In the meantime, cultivation in Syria 
trebled to 2.1 million ha, sheep numbers also trebled to 3.4 million head, while camels 
started to give way to tractors and trucks (Issawi 1951; Widmer 1936).  Sba`ah 
households were adapting to the changing demands in the market place.  Whereas they 




1930).  As all three tribes now had sheep in large numbers but still broadly lacked the 
ability to truck water, conflict arose between Sba`ah and the old sheep herding tribes over 
water and pastures in the near steppe during winter and spring months.  
Together with an expansion of agriculture, the rising sheep numbers demanded 
changes in the customary land tenure system, at least in the near steppe.  Of immediate 
concern to the Hadidiyin, the Mawali and the Sba`ah, was an untangling of their 
overlapping dirah in the near steppe and the establishment of discrete tribal territories as 
a basis for access rights to natural resources.  Once this was achieved, investment either 
in water or agriculture could be undertaken without risk of inter-tribal disputes.  To 
facilitate this shift, the disputing tribes sought an agreement through customary channels 
and under the auspices of the state.  By far the most important of such agreements was 
the Damascus tribal treaty of 1956, which divided over 500,000 ha of the Aleppo steppe 
among the three tribes, although pre-existing claims to water and pasture were kept 
intact.  The political process used in this treaty, and other similar ones before and after it, 
was based on tribal custom.  
In 1958, when the role of customary law and structures was formerly abolished in 
Syria, the Damascus treaty and others like it were automatically annulled. The authorities 
assumed full responsibility for rangeland management, placing it with the Steppe 
Directorate from 1961.  Nevertheless, customary institutions continued to exert authority 
over rangeland management and tribal control.  Documented evidence, such as that 
described below, shows that substantial cooperation to regulate control and access to 




political environment, including a significant level of tribal corporate activity in 
protecting rights.  
In 1958, large numbers of the Sba`ah left Syria for Saudi Arabia following the 
abolition of tribal rights.  With most of Sba`ah gone, Ghanatsah (a faction of the 
Hadidiyin) took the opportunity to reoccupy and claim for themselves a portion of the 
treaty lands called Abu al Naytel and Dayl`.  They went unchallenged for more than a 
decade, but in 1974 Muharrab al-Rakan, a son of the supreme shaykh of Sba`ah, "and the 
members of Sba`ah represented by him," (SAR 1975) returned to Syria and immediately 
laid a claim on the Abu al-Naytel well and the lands of Dayl`. 
Ghanatsah took the matter to the state authorities.  The head (mudir) of the 
Palmyra administrative district carried out preliminary consultations with the disputing 
tribes and visited the questioned site.  The "final meeting" (SAR 1975) to resolve the 
problem was convened on the 10th of February 1975. The decision went in favor of 
Ghanatsah and the old mutual border from the 1956 treaty was adjusted to the new 
agreement.  The legal precedent for the decision was adverse possession, i.e. undisputed 
occupation of property for a given period of time becomes the property of the occupant.   
Six years later, the situation flared up again when Muharrab attempted again to 
extend his area of control by cultivating his shared border with Ghanatsah in an area 
referred to as the "airport".  This was land Ghanatsah believed was theirs.  Another round 
of resolution talks was held. The settlement reached went again in favor of Ghanatsah. 
Muharrab was allowed to reap his crop "as he had ploughed and planted it" but 




This agreement, like many others
12, was extraordinary considering the Ba`thist 
constitution and ideology.  The decision had been reached with the full participation of 
the state authorities.  As far as the written law was concerned the disputed land was state 
land and, since it was not part of a cooperative, was technically open to all Syrian citizens 
and their livestock. The shaykhs' intermediary roles were formally terminated in 1958, 
but two decades later little had changed in practice.  Indeed, customary institutions 
remain the principal mechanism regulating access to steppe resources on a day-to-day 
basis, while the state continues to implicitly recognize and endorse tribal customary 
rights and practices, with high officials and Party cadres guaranteeing agreements and 
signing documents in the name of the state. It is important to note, however, that the 
Steppe Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, with statuary responsibility for steppe 
resource management, was not involved in this particular agreement. It was seen instead 
as a political not a land management problem per se.   
 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATUTORY AND CUSTOMARY TENURE ON THE 
PLANTATIONS 
 
That violations of plantation rules of access are a particular problem in Aleppo is 
at least partially explained by the overlap of tribal territories.  Both plantations discussed 
below form a group of four located on lands held by the Abraz clan of the Hadidiyin.   
                                                 
12 Additional post-1958 documented territorial treaties have come to light. The dates of these agreements 




A guard at one of these plantation suggested he had turned over for prosecution 
no less than 200 Abraz herders in five years in addition to the "many others caught but 
not charged" (Conversation with the guard: Maraghah, Syria, 21st June 1999).  Faysal, 
the shaykh of Abraz, puts the number of Abraz prosecuted as a whole at 370.  Evidence 
from official communications on a proposed fifth plantation in the Abraz area strongly 
suggests that appropriation of land for the plantations was causing serious pasture 
shortages for the clan.  Upon hearing of the proposed plantation in early 1995, Faysal 
wrote to the Aleppo Governor: 
 
Once these lands are annexed and the said plantation is established ... we 
would no longer have lands for our sheep to graze.  We were moved from 
`Ein al-Zarqah and Maraghah where two plantations were established. To 
the north of us is the al-Haib tribe—with whom we have a bloody 
dispute—[and consequently] we are not welcome on their pasture. 
Moreover, the establishment of the plantation would cause hundreds of 
herders to move away, many of whom have houses in the area.
13 
 
As a result, the proposed plantation was abandoned, although the reason given 
was that the site was in fact "one of the good sites in our steppe in terms of plant cover."  
This episode demonstrates that past decisions for plantation location failed to assess the 
implications of customary land tenure and the inevitable impact this would have on the 
household economy of local range uses.  
It is an unwritten rule within the Steppe Directorate that first refusal on plantation 
leases goes to local herders and clans, despite formal claims that the steppe and the 
plantations are open to all.  Problems of who can have access to a plantation do not 
generally arise when the site is located entirely within a particular clan territory.  
                                                 





However, when the plantation border cuts across tribal territories, or unwelcome groups 
from far afield attempt to purchase a lease on a local plantation, then the incongruence of 
tenure systems can result in some very serious problems.  Of the four plantations under 
study by ICARDA in 1996, two plantations fell wholly within clan territories but the 
other two did not.  In the latter, disputes over access between neighboring groups resulted 
in considerable difficulties for the authorities.  
Such was the case when two clans, Bu Hasan and Jimlan (both of the Hadidiyin), 
attempted to gain access to the plantation and establish de facto possession of land 
originally held by three tribal territories: the Bu Salah of Abraz, the Twimat of 
Ghanatsah, and the Ma`atah, all three of which are also part of the Hadidiyin.  In the 
previous two leasing seasons, the plantation had been leased predominately by the Bu 
Salah, Abraz, which had also secured the vast majority of leases for that season.  The 
only other group to have grazed the plantation in previous seasons, and who were there 
again in 1996, was that led by members of Bu Kurdy (Ghanatsah) who neighbored the 
reserve to the north.  When Bu Hasan and Jimlan also lodged requests for licenses, all 
applications were approved.  Both Bu Kurdy and Bu Salah, however, felt that Jimlan and 
Bu Hasan had no right to any leases on the plantation, as their tribal grazing grounds at 
Hrabjah were unaffected by the plantation.  They took their grievance to the plantation 
guard who cancelled Jimlan's and Bu Hasan's leases on the spot.  
Aggrieved, Jimlan and Bu Hasan took their protest to the authorities, reiterating 




went with the heads of the provincial Steppe Directorate and Peasants’ Union
14 office to 
Abu al-Fayad to settle the dispute.  The resolution went in Jimlan's and Bu Hasan's favor.  
The authorities hired a local tractor and ploughed a boundary line within the plantation to 
separate the disputing parties.  As compensation, Bu Salah and Bu Kurdy were released 
from all plantation rules: firewood could henceforth be collected, sheep numbers would 
be unregulated, and camping, watering and milking could take place in the plantation.  
The Head of the Steppe Directorate protested strongly against the decision but was 
ultimately unsuccessful in changing it.  Within a few days, instead of the 22,000 sheep 
paid for by the Bu Salah and the Bu Kurdy groups there were now 40,000 in the 
plantation. The plantation was shut down after three weeks. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The above discussion demonstrates the value of customary institutions supportive 
of herder mobility, reciprocal arrangements with respect to resource use, and inter-tribal 
conflict resolution mechanisms when it comes to rangeland management.  Contrary to 
popular belief that they have broken down and disappeared, many customary institutions 
in Syria remain strong and continue to be influential in the property rights domain. Their 
inherent flexibility means they are usually better suited to the prevailing non-equilibrium 
environment of the Syrian rangelands when compared to the rigid statutory laws and 
inappropriate technologies imposed by the state.  Imposition of technologies will not 
succeed unless tribal land tenure and institutions are taken into account.  Customary 
institutions represent a superior foundation for an integrated and inclusionary resource 
                                                 
14 The Peasants’ Union is an arm of the ruling Ba’th Party and took control of co-operatives from the 




management system.  The continuing existence of these institutions contradicts Hardin’s 
assumption of the inability of resource users to coordinate their actions to avert over-
exploitation.  It is not possible to prove that these customary methods are 
environmentally sustainable since ecological studies based on the new paradigms in the 
field have yet to be conducted. But what these institutions do represent are the 
foundations of a sustainable system by reducing transaction costs and affording local 
legitimacy.  
Past policies centralizing rangeland management were founded on misplaced 
assumptions about the physical dynamics of the steppe environment as well as the 
capacity of herders to cooperate together and regulate their use of pastoral resources.  
Shrub technologies like Atriplex have proven ill-suited to livestock as well as 
incompatible with herders' socioeconomic realities.  Plantations likewise conflict with 
mobility objectives and customary land tenure, fueling the incidence of tribal conflict.  In 
contrast to this failed top-down approaches are the enduring customary institutions whose 
sensitivity to the physical and social environment and inherent legitimacy have enabled 
them to overcome statutory abolition, even to the extent of obliging the authorities to 
recognize customary agreements.  
With a fresh understanding of arid environments and the customary system, there 
are new opportunities for rangeland management in Syria. Tribes no longer represent a 
political threat as they once did, but they do represent irreplaceable social capital. With 
doubts raised about imported shrub technologies, plantations, and steppe policy more 
broadly, existing tribal systems offer a solid foundation on which to build an effective 




faces the authorities in Syria and elsewhere in the region is to respond to this latent 
opportunity and enter into a genuine partnership with the steppe users for the 
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